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FORT.TR JOEPARDY IN CASES OF DISCHARGED JURIES.
The word jeopard signifies danger or m ril; and in
law the term is applied to the situation of a prisoner
where a jury is sworn and empanelled to try his case,
and charged with his deliverance upon a valid indictment.
(Am. and Eng. Ency. of Law, Vol. II., p. 926; I Bish.
Crim. Law SJec. 1015; Cooley Const. Lim. 327; Kendall v.
State, 65 Ala. 492; Teat v. State, 53 Miss. 453; State v.
Redmond, 17 Ia. 329.)
The principle of jeopardy is found in one of the
maxims of the civil law -- "Nom bis idem" -- , and is em-
bodied in the very elements of the common law also,--
"nemo debet bis vexari prouno et eadem causa" and "Nemo
debet bis puniti propmo delicto";and is therefore an an-
cient and well established principle which is a part of
the universal law of reason, justice, and conscience.
(AMI. and -ng. Ency.of Law, Vol. II., p. 296, and note;
4 Black. Comm. 315.)
In the United States, this just and well settled
principle was adopted in the Federal Constitution. Amend-
ment V. of the Constitution provides, that ""To person
shall be subject for the same offence to be put twice
in jeopardy of life and limb." And nearly all of the
states have followed with a similar provision in their
separate constitutions. But it has been held that where
such provisions have been omitted in the state constitu-
tions, the guarantee in the United States Constitution
a
does not apply, it beingArestriction on the Federal Gov/
ernment alone. (Bemm. v. Whitney, 108 1ass. 6; Barron vt
al. v. City of Baltimore, 7 Peters, 243; Withers v. Buc-
ley et al., 20 How. 84.) And in the recent Connecticut
case of the State v. Lee .aY'Y ), it has even been
held that in criminal cases, the state may secure a new
trial on appeal, for error of law. In fact a statute of
the state allows such an appeal in such cases. (See Gen-
Stat. Cnm., Sec/ 1637. being 1886 Stat. 15).
In this paper the discussion of the plea of "former
jeorpady" or"once in jeopardy" will be limited to cases
of the discharge of a jury before verdict, by the court,
either ona account of (1) inability to agree, (2) ill-
ness or other disability of the juror, (3) expiration of
term of court,(4)what the court in its discretion, may
3deem, necessity, (5) withdrawal of jury for technical
purpo ses.
Sergeant Hawkins, in his Pleas of the Crown, Vol.
2, Ch. 47, Sec. 1, says:"It seems to have been anciently
an unconverted rule and hath been allowed even by those
of the contrary opinion to have been the general tradi-
tion of the law, that a jury, sworn and char ;ed in a cap-
ital case, cannot be discharged without the prisoner's
consent,tilthey have given a verdict." Lord Coke was
the atthority for the rule laid down by Hawkins. In his
first Inst. 227, he asserted the doctrine th-,s: "A jury
sworn and charged in case of life and member, cannot be
discharged by the court or any other, but they; ought to
give a verdict." In the third Inst. 110, he says: "To
speak it here once for all, if one i rson be indicted
for treason, or a felony, or of larceny, and plead not
guilty, and therefore a jury is returned and wworn, their
verdict must be heard, and they cannot be discharged."
Lord Hale admits that such ,as the rule "by the an-
cient law". He says: "By the ancient lw, if the jury
sworn had once been particularly charged with the prison-
er, as before shewed, it was commonly held they must
give up the verdict, and they could not be discharged be-
fore their verdict was given up." "But,"he goes on to
say, "the contrary course has for a long time obtained
at Newgate, and nothing is more ordinary than after the
jury sworn, and charged with the prisoner, and evidence
given; yet if it app ars to the court that some of the
evidence is kept back, or taken off, or that there may
be a fuller discovery, and the offence notorious, as mur-
der or burglary, and that the evidence, though not suffi-
cient to convict the prisoner, yet give the court a great
and strong suspicion of his guilt, the court may discharg
thejury of the prisoner, and remit him to the gaol for
further evidence; and accordingly it hath been practised
in most circuits of England, for otherwise many notoriotz
murders and burglaries may pass unpunished by the acquit-
tal of persons probably guilty, where the full evidencet
not searched out or given. 2 Hales P. C., 294, 95.)
whether a court possess the power to discharge a jury
who cannot agree on a verdict, and because they cannot
agree, in a capital case, has long been a vexed question.
It may be at least a satisfaction to examine the authori-
ties, British and American, both in support of and in
opposition to the power. In England, perhaps the doc-
trine may be regarded as permanently established, that
the power does exist in the discretionof the court. In
the United States a different practice prevails. In
some the power is entirely disclaimed; in others it is
acknowledged in a qualified manner. In others again,
it is recognized in all its latitude and strength.
7e have seen that Lord Coke laid down the rule"once
for all" in the third Inst., that after a jury is re-
turned and sworn they cannot be discharged; that Hawkins
adopts as "anciently and uncontrovertedly the rule". The
doctrine was incorporated without qualification in the
aarlier editions of.Biackstone's Commentaries. In the
4th Edition, published in 1770, appears the following
sentence: "When the evidenceon both sides is closed, the
jury cannot be discharged until they have given their
verdict, but are to consider it, and deliver in, with
the same forms upon civil causes, only they cannot in
the criminal case giva a private verdict." In the sub-
sequent edition published in 1803, the same sentence is
changed so as to read: "When the evidence on both sides
is closed, and indeed when any evidence hath been givem,
the jury cannot be discharged, unless in cases of evident
necessity,till they have given in their verdict etc."
'"That should constitute the evident necessuty which is to
justify the discharge of the jury, must depend, of coursq
on the discretion of the court.
In a note to the case of Chedwick v. Hughes, (ear-
then, 464), it is reported, that "Holt, Chief Justice, at
at the sitting in VTestminster, 9th November, 1698, in
the ease of perjury tried beforehim, between the King ard
one Perkins, said, that it was the opinion of all the
judges of England upon debate between them, (1) that in
capital cases, a juror cannot be withdrawn, though all
parties consent to it; (2) that in criminal cases, not
capital, a juror may be withdrawn, if both parties con-
sent, but not otherwise; (3) that in all civil cases a
jury cannot be withdrawn but by the consent of both par-
ties. The case of the King v. Perkins is reported to the
same effect precisely in the report of cases determined
in the time of Lord Holt, in Holts Report, 403.
And so we may say that such was the law of England
until 1746, when the case of King v. Kinlocks arose.
Foster's Crown Lav, 16 (Opinion of Foster,J., page 29)
In this case, the prisoners, Alexanc3er and Charles Kin-
lock were brought to trial for high treason. One jury
was sworn and charged with them. The junior counsel for
the crown opened the indictment, and the Solicitor Gener-
al proceeded to open the evidence. At this point, Chief
Justice Villes, befre any evidence is given, told the
prisoner's counsel that he wasl41nformed they had some oh-
jectien to make in behalf of their clients, founded on th
#he Act of Union, which was proper to be spoke of before
the counsel for the crown went into their evidence. The
objection of the prisoner's counsel was in the nature of
a pplea to the jurisdiction of the court, which objecti-
tion, the ehief Justice said, could not be made on the
issue of not guilty, and he therefore proposed that a
juror shogld be withdrawn; that the prisoners should
have leave to withdraw their ple af not guilty, and to
plead this matter specially; and that the Attorney Gen-
eral might demur and so the point would come regularly
before the court. Therefore, on motion of the prisoner's
counsel, and at their request, and with the assent of
the attorney general, a juror was withdrawn and the ju-
ry discharged. It was urged that the objection might be
raised on the plea of not guilty, and that the trial
might go on upon the issue joined but it was otherwise
ordered.
The prisoners withdrew their former plea of not
guilty, in order that they might be ready the next day
with their pleas to the jurisdiction in form -- to which
the Attorney General declared he would demur instanter.
The next day the defendants were arraigned and ten-
dered plea to the jurisdiction. The court over-ruled
the plea and sustained the demurrer, and ordered the de-
fendants to plead over to the treason, They pleaded not
guilty, another jury was sworn and they were found guilt-
y. They moved in arrest of judgment. The first jury hd
been sworn and charged with them on October 28, and the
second on October 29. And the prisoner's counsel, there-
fore,iniisted that the latter was a mistrial and the ver
dict a mere nullity. The Lord Chief Justice interrupted
the argument and admitting the unsettled state of the
law on the subject and the importance of the question,
decided to postpone further consideration of it till the
next adjournment, when he should obtain assistance of
all the judges of the commission.
On the 15 December, 1741, the cause ,vas argued be-
fore the two Chief Justices 7Telles and Lee, ilr. Justice
Wright, and six ofher barons and justices. Yr. Jodrell
argued in behalf of the defendants in arrest of judgment
He admitted that in the time of Charles II, the practice
of the courts nad been in favor of discharging juries,
but that ever since the Revolution, a contrary practice
had uniformly prevailed, and that even in the reign of
James II., the judges in Lord Delamere's Case, (4 State
Trials, 232, old folio) declared, that a jury sworn and
charged in a capital case, cannot be discharged, but
must give a verdict. As to the law preceding and follow-
ing the revolution he refferred to 1 and 3 Coke's Inst.
and Carthen, 434, before cited. lie then proceeded to
show that the practice since that time in criminal cases,
had been conformable to this rule, and cited the cases
o-, Th e King v. 1M organ (9 GeB. 2), and The Xing v. Jeff,
(7 Geo. 2) The latter case is reported in Strang's Ke-
ports, p. 984. In both of which cases Lodd iardwicke,
citing Chedwick v. Hughes,(catthen, 434) refused to
withdraw a juror at the prayer of the King's counsel,
because the defendant's counsel refused consent to it.
As to the matter of consent, in this case, the counsel
observed, that consent might generally be said to have
the effect of curing an irregularity, but never can jus-
tify the breaking through any of the fundamental princi-
ples of law; especially such rules as are in favor of
a prisoner nswering for his life; for a prisoner so sit
uated, may, perhaps, be overawed into a consent, manifes
ly to his prejudice; and this circumstance should, there-
fore, throw thematter of the consent quite oft of the
case.
To this the counsel for the Crown answered, denying any
importance or authority to the resolutions in Carthen,
and cited in support of the proposition that a juror
might be withdrawn and a jury discharged the cases of
Mansell, (1 Anderson's Rep. 103,104) and Whitebread's
Case (2 State Trials, 829)(old folio Vol.) Add as to t1e
rule laid down by Coke, they were cited in answer, 2
Hale's P. C., 295-6-7. above referred to, and to King v.
Jane D- (1 Ventr. j9).
On Decetber 20, the court delivered their opinion,
and all excppt one agreed that judgment ought to pass
against the prisoners. They admitted the rule laid down
by Coke to be a good general rule, but not universally
binding, especially where it would be productive of
great hardship or mianifest injustice. In the present
case, the prisonei-s were advised upon their trial to ob-
ject to the jurisdiction of the court; but having plead-
ed to the issue, it was suggested thtat they were too late
w'ith their objection. And, therefore, in order to let
them into the benefit of the objection, liberty wa- giv-
en them at t.heir request,to withdraw their plea of not
guilty before evidence given, LMd to plead to the juris-
diction. Consequently the prisoners had no ri-ht to com-
plain of that which was necessarily a consequence of an
indulgence shown them by the court. The judges paid ver-
y little attention to the resolution ±in Carthen and to
Lord Delamere's Cae, and joined in condemning the case
of VTqitebread(stpra) as cruel and illegal and hoped it
would be never drawn into example. In that case the de-
fendant was indicted for high treason, andon December,
17 1678,he v.as brought to trial, a jury sworn and charg-
ed with the prisoner, and evidence brought in and exam-
ined and found sufficient. And so the jury ;-as discharg-
ed without verdict; and on June 13, they were brought t:
trial again on the same indictment add convicted.
In the opinion of r. Justice Faster, he began by
saying, that the counsel on both sides had gone into the
general question, touching the power of the court 6 dis-
charge juries sworn and charged in capital cases, far-
ther than he thought was necessary. The greneral ques-
tion~e said, involved a point of great difficulty and
mighty importance. But he chose to consider the 1 resent
case singular as it stood on the record.
The question, therefore, was not, whether a jury
might be discharged after evidence given, in order to
the preferring of a new indictment better suited to the
nature of the case. This was frequently done before the
revolution, and in one or two instances since. Nor was h
the present question, whether the court might discharge
a jury there undue practices appear to have been used
such as was the unjustifiable proceeding in the case of
Whitebread(supra).
He then proceeded to state what he took the ques-
tion tobe; and that was, whether, in a capital case,
where the prieaner may make his full defence by counsel,
the court may discharge the jury upon the :,otion of the
prisoner's counsel, and at his own request, and with the
consent of the Attorney General before evidence 6iven,in
order to let the prisoner into a defence, -hen, in the o
pinion of the court, he could not otherwise have been
let in. And he was clearly of opinion, that a j;zry migt
in such case be discharged, and the discharging of them
under these circumstam es would not operate to discharge
the prisoner from any future trial for the same offence.
The learned justice observed that the rule laid down
by Coke was in very general terms, and besides, -,as wven
unfounded in reason and unwarranted by authority. He
then stated the case of Rockford,19§, (1 State Trials,
661,01d Folio VoL.), a case almott exactly similar to tle
one at bar in which Lord Holt and the other judges entei
tained that the prayer of the prisoner's counsel, and wih
with the consent of the Attorney General, a jury sworn
and charged in a case of high treason mipht be dischar5;-
ed, uithout barringanoth r trial. In this case also, ti
court adopted the expedient, at the paryer of the prison-
ers and their counsel, and with the consent of the attor-
ney General,- not to bring the prisoner's life twice in
jeopardy,- but in odder merely to give them one chance
for their lives, which, it ':z:s thought, they had lost ty
pleading to issue.
The discharge of the gury in this case was not a
strain in favor of prerogative; it was not done to the
prejudice of the prisoner; on the contrary, it was in-
tcnded as a favor to them. In that light it was consid-
ered by the court; in that light it was considered b: tlB
prisoners and their counsel, and accordingly they prayed
it; and in that 'Jight the Attorney General consented to
it. And in that light, the judge concluded, he knew of
no objection to it in point of law or reason.
Tr. Justice 7Tright, dissenting, admitted that the d
discharging of the jury was an instance of great indul-
gence toward the prisoners. But he thought it safer to
adhere to the rule of law. which was clearly laid down by
Lord Coke, thah upon any account toiestablish a power in
judges, which it was admittmd had been grossly abused,
and might be so again. He observed that the court did
not deny, outright, the ancient law laid down by Coke,
and repeated by Hawkins and Blackstone. On the contrary,
they said:- "Admitting the rule laid down by Coke to be
a good general rule, yet it cannot be universally bind-
ing7 He also noted that Mr. Justice Foster expressly
waived an opinion oh the general question - owning it to
be one"of great difficulty and mighty importance".
Justice Wright continues: If there were no founda-
tion for the general rule laid down by Coke; if the"AR
thorities" to which he refers in support of it, "does
not in the least warrant it"; if the conclusion drawn
by him therefrom was mistaken and false, it is very sin-
gular that the court would not at once disclaim the rule,
and declare it notto be law. And it is no less singular,
that, under such circumstam es, 1.1r. Justice Poster should
have considered "the general question", depending on the
existence of a rule ,Thich had no existence, "to be a
point of great difficulty and of mighty importance."
7hat great difficulty the e could be in the judge decid-
ing against a rule, laid down by a text-writer, .-rhich
had not the authority of an adjudicated case"to -.arrant
it", is at least not at all clear.
It may then be said, that if the"E'eneral rule" had(1)
been exploded, the several laws, all dependingupon it,
as to which 1.r. Justice Foster waived a decision, wo'ld
(1) Foster's Crown Law, p. 30.
no longer be open to disdussion. Dit the decision rest-
ed as it was made, and left the law thus in England un-
til 1812, when the question arose in the case of ?,he
King v. 'Edwards (4 Taunt. 309), The offence of the. pris-
oner was capital. The facts upon which the question de-
pended were, that after indictment, arraignment, the jur-
y charged and evidence gived, one of the jurymen fell
down in a fit and could not proceed with his duties as a
juryman. Whereupon, Wood, B., discharged the jury, and
directed a new jury to be sworn consisting of the same
eleven persons who remained of the former jury , and an-
other. The objection made by the counsel was that a ju-
ry once sworn and charr-ed with a criminal ease, could
not be discharged without giving a ver('ict; and it was
elaborarely argued in the Exchequer Chamber before all
the judges of England, except two. Thecourt stopped t1I
counsel for the prisoner, and said that the question had
been decided in so many cases, that it .,.,as now the settld
law of the land, and gave judgment against the prisoner.
77hat the cases were the court did not say. There was a
a nisiprius case in 1794, The King v. Scalbert (2 Leach.
C. R. C. 620), where the same decision -,-as given upon
like facts as those of The King v. :dwkrds(supra).
In the
In the United States, the rule is not uniform in tin
several states where the question has arisen for judg-
ment, the weight of authority, perhaps, being in favor af
the exercise of the discretionary power of the court.
The cases in New York have held uniformly in favor
of the exercise of the power. In the case of The People
v. Denton,(2 Johns.275) the indictment was for a misdea-
meanor. On the trial, the jury retired, having heard tle
evidence, and after having been out all night, came into
court with a verdict of not guilty; but, on being Poll
ed , three of them dissented. They finally informed the
court that there was no probability of tP-eir ever agree-
ing on a verdict, and without the consent of the defenda
ant, the" were discharged by the court. The indictment
having been removed to the Supreme Court, it was th, *e
held thatthe power to discharge the jury existed, al-
though to be exercised with caution, Ahd only after a
reasonable endeavor to obtain a verdict proved to be un-
availing; that the discharge in this cruse was necessary
and proper, and that he should be again tried by a'-other
jurr on the same indictment.
The case of the People v. glcott (2 Johns. 301,1800)
was an indictment for a conspiracy to defraud the Bank
of Tew York. The jury having remained out a long time,
says the report, that is, from about eight o'clock in
the evening until two o'clock the next day, at length a-
greed on the following verdict:- "T]Iat there was an ag-
reement between Roe and the prisoner to obtain money
from the Ban]. of New York, but with the intent to return
it again." This verdict the court considered as imper-
fect, and refused to receive it. Ihe court then asked
the jury if there was any prospect of their agreeing on
a general verdict of guilty or not guilty, and the fore-
man said, "No". To several of the questions asked by the
court, as to whether they could agree upon a special ver-
dict, the answers being in the negative, the court, wit'-
out consent of the prisoner, discharged thejury. It was
held by the Supreme Court, Kent J., delivering the opin-
ion, that the inferior court did not exceed its powers,
and that it must be a pretty clear czse of an abuse of
discretion to induce the court to say that the jury ought
not to have been discharged.
The above case arose in 1800. 'he next case arose
in 1804, People v. Barrett and Wood (2 Caines, 304). It
was an indictment for a conspiracy. T.ae jury was sworn,
'he defendants were arraigned, and pleaded not guilty.
Immediately after this, the District Attorney served on
Barrett a notice to produce a promissory note mentioned
in the indictment or that parol testimony viold be given
of its contents. The trial proceeded, the note was call-
ed for, and on itsnot being produced, the District Attor-
ne- offered the -arol evidence. Counsel for defendant cb
jected, alleging the want of due notice, as the note was
not in their possession, but at a house fourteen or fif-
teen miles distant. ''he court refused the parol testimo-
ny. 7hereupon the District Attorney Moved for leave to
withdraw a 7uror, without the corn ent of the defendants,
and the jury was dischurged. On a subsequent day they
wrere a _ain arraigned, tried and found guilty on the same
indictment; and the question vas, whether these circum-
stances were not sufficient to arrest the judgment. The
opinion of the Supreme Court was, that the court below
ought not to proceed to judgment on the conviction, but
dischargg the defendants, "Tithout denying the right of
the courts, " they said, "to withdraw a juror in crimi-
nal cases, and put the defendant on his trial a second
time, it is evident that this power should not be light-
ly used, but confined, as much as may be, to cases of
ur,:ent necessity, where, by the act of God, or by some
sudC(en or knforseen accident, it is impossible to pro-
ceed without manifest injustice to the public or to the
defendant himself". They also said that they did not
mean to define all or any of the cases in which the prac-
tice might be pursued, but they all agreed that a defen
ant ought, in no case, to be put on a second trial for
the same offence, where a juror had been discharged on
f666ther ground than because the public prosecutor found
himself unable to proceed, for the want of sufficient
testimony to convict, and where that inability was the
consequence of his not having taken the necessary maas-
URES T -  OBTAINIT. It would be much better, thought the
court, that the guilty now and then escape, than t6 in-
troduce or sanction a practice which might place the in-
nocent entirely in the power of the court or public pros-
ecutor, which the mode of trial by jury was intended to
guard against.
The next succeeding case, that of The People v.
Goodwin (18 Johns., 187), ,-as an indictment for manslauEa
ter. The trial lasted five days. The jury retired to
consider of their verdict at 2 o'clock int he morning of
the fifth day, and remained until 6 o'clock in the after-
noon of the same, when they came into court, and being
asked as to their verdict, answered that they found the
prisoner guilty, but begged leave to recommend him to the
mercy of the court. Before the verdict was recorded, the
counsel ] ayed that the jury might be polled, which hav-
ing been done, the third juror answered not guilty. T
They were then sent out to reconsider their verdict. At
half past eleven P. 11., and within a half hour of the le-
gal termination of the session, the court sent to know
vwhether they had agreed, and being answered in the nega-
tive, they were sent for and returned into court. On be-
ing asked by the presiding judge whether they would be a-
ble to agree within half an hout, being the latest pe-
riod to-which the court sould sit according to law, the
jurors answered that "There was not the least probabili-
ty of their agreeing". They were thereupon discharged
by the court. "Upon full consideration", the court were
of the opinion, "that although the power of discharging
a Jury is a delkoate and highly important trust, yet thed
it does exist in cases of exteeme necessityand that it
may be exercised without operating as an acquittal of t v
defendant, as well in felonies as in misdemeanors. It
exists and may be discreetly exercised in cases where the
Jury, from the length of time they have been conslderi3
\
a cause, S* thir" 40ability to agree, my be fairWT
presum&e al nevdf likely to agree,- unless prsed to de
so from the pressing calls of famine or bodily exhaustiO
But this would be forcim them to agree, ad a forced
verdict is unlawful and may be set aside. See Green v.
Telfair (11 How. Pr., 260); Muntoon v. Russell (50 How.
Pr. 154); Ervin v. Hamilton (50 How. Pr. 52).
Thus it seems that the rule is that the right to en
erciae the power exists only incases of eXtvem and abse
lute necessity. What shall Satisfy it must af course dq
pond ipon the judgment of the incumbent of the Bench. M
And the judgment of the co urt in this case was that the
termination of the powers of the court constitutes that
"extreme and absolute necessity$ which justifios the dis.
eharge of the jury.
The People v. Green (13 Wend. 55) was also a case
decided in the New York Supreme Court. It was an in-
dictment for grand larceny, and serves well to illustrate
how far such a principle -,ill be carried when once it
gets a start. 'The prisoner was indicted, arraigned and
tried on the same day. The jury retired, and after beii
absent I6alf an hour, returned into court and stated that
they had not agreed. The counsil for the prisoner on be
ing askedto consent to their discharge, refused to do s(4
wheeupon the court discharged the jury. Two days aften-
ward, the sare grand jury vrhich had found the indictment
undaer whioh he was tried, found another against him for
the same offence, on which he was again arraigned. In
the Supreme Court the judgment was affirmed. The court
said that,'It was very unusual to discharge upon only
a half an hour's consultation of the jury. Possibly, aft
ter longer discursion there might have bee-.n an unanimi.
ty of opinion"- --- -"Juries should not be discharged
because, upon the first comparing of opinions, there
happens to be a disagreement. Temperate discussion may
produce unanimity, and time should be allowed for that
purpose; but where such time has been allowed, and the
court become satisfied that there is no reasonable pros-
pect of an agreement by further discussion, it then be-
comes their duty to discharge. -"On that point the
court below, w'ho may have known the character of the ju-
ry, may have come satisfactorily to the belief that they
never would agree, and that longer confinement would be
tnavailing.? - - - - "It is true" continued the court,
"that in all cases which have arisen in this court, the
jury has not been discharged until a much longer time hzd
been spent in efforts to agree than in this case; but,
where it is admitted that the' court has power to dis-
charge, and that the time when the power ought to be ex-
ercised rests in the discretion of the court, a case is
presented in .-rTich it seems, that if the power has not
bf en discreetly exercised, there can be no remedy by
writ of error". This last, it seems to me, is an exam-
ple of legal logic which surely leads to a harsh conclu-
sion.
We may consider these cases sufficient to show the
doctrine as established in the State of Ne:r York. Some
of the other states, especially Massachusetts, Pew Jersey,
and the Supreme Couirt of the United States, have follow-
ed the same doctrine. A few of the states, notablyT North
Carolina, Pennsylvania and Virg;inia, in their earlier d)-
cisions at least, held -n apparently opposite view, but
they are tending gradually in the direction of the other
states, all favoring a relaxation of the strict rule
attempted to be laid down in some of th- early common
law cases. To make an exhaustive survey of all the cas-
es in the several states would ledd me beyond the purpos
and limits of this article. Such a task, though perhaps
valuable, would add no new arguments to the question
either pro or con, but would simply be an enumeration of
results.

